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Abstract 
 
 
The uneven geographic distribution of nonprofit organizations has been an issue of 
debate in the implementation of social policy since the 1980s. This paper proposes a 
political market framework to test an integrated explanation for the geographic 
distribution of nonprofits. Government failure theory attributes this variation to the 
distribution of social problems, so that nonprofit organizations are more prevalent in 
jurisdictions displaying larger and more diverse service needs that governments are not 
prepared or willing to tackle. In contrast, entrepreneurship theory argues that nonprofit 
organizations are created in jurisdictions with higher levels of prosperity and resources 
and a stronger tradition of generosity. This second explanation suggests that nonprofit 
organizations are established by entrepreneurs seeking to maximize non-monetary 
returns. Our framework argues that both demand-side and supply-side market forces help 
to explain the variation in the geographical distribution of nonprofit organizations. 
 
The hypotheses are tested using data assembled from nonprofit organizations established 
at the local level in continental Portugal. The variation in nonprofit sector activities is 
measured by the number of users and by the number of nonprofit organizations operating 
by block groups responsible for the implementation of social policy in each local 
jurisdiction. These groups constitute our dependent variables and include nursing homes, 
day care centers, home care organizations, leisure centers, and homeless care 
organizations. The paper employs a series of economic, social and demographic features 
of the local jurisdictions as explanatory factors to test the propositions derived from the 
political market framework for the formation and size of nonprofit organizations. Our 
findings indicate that citizen donations, demand heterogeneity, income, and population 
size are relevant predictors of the dimension of the local nonprofit sector.   
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The Implementation of Social Policy through the Nonprofit Sector: 
A Political Market Framework 
The size and scope of the nonprofit sector is expanding as a result of the 
devolution of services from the national to the local level and from the public sector to 
the civil society. However, the reliance in nonprofit organizations to implement social 
policies is far from homogeneous across localities, regions, and countries. What factors 
explain the uneven distribution of nonprofit organizations across the territory? Why do 
some communities rely more in nonprofit service delivery organizations than others?  
Prior work exploring demand and supply-side explanations for the size and scope 
of the nonprofit sector has failed to provide a consistent theory able to explain these 
variations. Research led by economists has been primarily centered on demand-side 
explanations (Weisbrod, 1975; 1977; Matsunaga and Yamauchi, 2004), largely ignoring 
empirical testing of supply-side arguments (Hansmann, 1987). More recent research has 
attempted to present a theoretical model to account for the variation in nonprofit density 
(Grønbjerg and Paarlberg, 2001), but the results are far from satisfactory. The authors 
find that nonprofit organizations are most prevalent in small communities with a higher 
proportion of college educated population and lower poverty rates (Grønbjerg and 
Paarlberg, 2001). This is a counterintuitive result that contradicts heterogeneity factors 
underlined by demand-side explanations of the formation and growth of these 
organizations. Other research focusing on supply-side explanations, particularly 
philanthropic culture theories, has failed to account for the growth of the nonprofit sector 
(Corbin, 1999).    
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This paper begins to fill this important lacuna by proposing a political market 
framework as an explanation for the uneven distribution of nonprofits across local 
jurisdictions. The framework argues that both demand-side and supply-side market forces 
help to explain the variation in the geographical distribution of nonprofit organizations. 
The goal is to reexamine prior findings in light of new theory and indicators, thus 
contributing to theory development and findings. 
 This article employs data from 278 Portuguese municipalities to test a set of 
hypotheses derived from the political market framework to explain the establishment and 
the number of users of nonprofit organizations. Following this introduction, the second 
segment describes the role of nonprofit sector organizations in the implementation of 
social policy. In the third section we develop a political market framework to explain the 
formation and use of nonprofit organizations in the provision of human and social 
services. In the fourth section we specify our methods and describe the variables 
employed in the empirical analysis. The fifth section presents our findings, followed by a 
short set of policy implications and directions for prospective research. 
 
The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Service Delivery 
Formal nonprofit organizations are subject to a nondistribution clause “…that 
prohibits the distribution of residual earnings to individuals who exercise control over the 
firm, such as officers, directors, or members” (Hansmann, 1987: 28). Furthermore, other 
authors underline additional common features of nonprofits, including self-government, 
voluntary activities, and public benefit (Salamon, 1992; Ferris, 1998). Our work is 
primarily concerned with entrepreneurial nonprofits. According to the classification 
 5 
proposed by Henry Hansmann (1987), these nonprofits are characterized by a permanent, 
non-elected board of directors and provide services to either donors or customers. 
Although some may work separately from or competing with government, most 
nonprofits are in close contact with local governments in the implementation of social 
policies, either as coordinated service partners or as subsidized service providers (Feiock 
and Andrew, 2006). This depiction is relevant to our analysis since in modern post-
industrial states nonprofit organizations play a primary role as partners or complements to 
local governments in delivering human and social services. 
The development of the welfare state in Portugal is associated with the 
Democratic Revolution of 1974. The expansion of social security, the establishment of 
the National Health Care Service, and the significant growth of the education system 
resulted in strong pressures over national resources, at a time that most European states 
were already facing fiscal and financial pressures to scale back the welfare state. As a 
result, most responsibilities regarding welfare functions are now shared by the public, 
private, and nonprofit sectors. Moreover, nonprofit sector activities are “regulated, 
fiscally controlled and financially supported by the state” (Perista, 2001: 192). This 
context provides the backdrop for our study and justifies the interest in exploring the 
factors determining the growth and diversity of the local nonprofit sector. 
 
Theories of Nonprofit Sector Size and Scope  
Several theories have been developed to explain the formation, expansion, and 
size of the nonprofit sector. Demand-side explanations are rooted on government failure 
theory that attributes this variation to the heterogeneity of community problems and 
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preferences (Weisbrod, 1975; 1977; Kingma, 1997). This account argues that nonprofit 
organizations are more prevalent in jurisdictions displaying larger and more diverse 
service needs that governments are not prepared or willing to tackle. Due to electoral 
constraints, government officials prefer to target the preferences of the median voter, 
leaving non-median preferences unattended and opening the market for nonprofit agents.  
Other developments from the demand-side perspective point to the transaction 
costs associated with contracting for services that entail information asymmetries 
between donors or customers and service providers. These contractual failures can be 
overcome by resorting to nonprofit organizations that are characterized by a non-
distributional constraint that removes profit maximization from the contractual agreement 
(Hansmann, 1980; 1987; Easley and O’Hara, 1983).  
Supply-side explanations are partly based upon entrepreneurship theory and argue 
that nonprofit organizations are created in jurisdictions with higher levels of 
entrepreneurship resources and a stronger tradition of generosity (Badelt, 1997). 
According to this justification nonprofit organizations are established by entrepreneurs 
seeking to maximize non-monetary returns. This section provides an overview of prior 
work accounting for the size and scope of the nonprofit sector. 
 
Government Failure Theory 
The root of government failure theory as an explanation for the expansion of the 
number of nonprofit organizations lies in the work of Burton Weisbrod (1975; 1977). The 
main argument is that government provides public goods service levels based on the 
preferences of the median voter due to electoral constraints imposed on elected officials. 
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Individuals and groups in society expressing higher demand levels for public goods turn 
to nonprofit organizations as a way to fulfill their preferences. A demand heterogeneity 
hypothesis is derived from government failure theory: more heterogeneous communities 
have more nonprofit organizations producing public goods, since citizen preferences are 
diverse from those of the median voter. 
Since its inception, government failure theory has been tested and extended to 
account for different assumptions of altruism, multiple outputs of nonprofit organizations, 
and the degree of collectiveness of public goods (Kingma, 1997). Several indicators have 
been employed to account for demand heterogeneity. Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen 
(1992) use educational attainment as a measure of heterogeneity and find support for a 
positive association between demand heterogeneity and the number of social service, 
education, and day care nonprofit organizations. James (1997) and Corbin (1999) find 
that religious diversity is positively associated with the size of the nonprofit sector. 
Matsunaga and Yamauchi (2004) conclude that age and unemployment measures of 
diversity behave according to theoretical expectations, but their racial diversity indicator 
fails to provide support for the theory.   
In spite of its wide diffusion, empirical tests of government failure theory have 
failed to produce consistent results. A recent survey of the literature shows that, more 
often than not, empirical results either fail to support the hypotheses suggested by the 
theory or are in outright contradiction with those hypotheses (Matsunaga and Yamauchi, 
2004). 
Other developments of government failure theory suggest that the level of 
government spending on public goods affects the size of the nonprofit sector in two ways. 
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First, increased direct spending by the public sector in human and social services reduces 
the size of the nonprofit sector since more citizen preferences are being accommodated. 
Second, the size and scope of the nonprofit sector is likely to increase if governments 
delegate responsibilities for service production to the nonprofit sector using public 
subsidies. Evidence supporting this hypothesis is mixed at best. Ben-Ner and Van 
Hoomissen (1992) find that the size of local government employment is negatively 
associated with the size of the nonprofit health care service sector, but state and federal 
government employment is positively related with social service nonprofits. Other work 
reports an absence of relationship between federal funding or local funding and the 
formation of nonprofit organizations (Grønbjerg and Paarlberg, 2001; Twombly, 2003).      
 
Contract Failure Theory 
Contract failure theory as an account for the formation and expansion of third 
sector organizations was first developed by Henry Hansmann (1980). The author argues 
that private organizations supplying public services pose information asymmetry 
problems to its consumers. When profit is the major incentive, users cannot trust 
producers to provide adequate service quantity and quality due to information 
asymmetries plaguing transactions. In contrast, organizations bearing the nonprofit label 
overcome the information asymmetry and offer the guarantees required by service users 
to engage in the transaction (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 2003). 
  Unlike most work on government failure theory, contract failure theory 
recognizes the influence of service characteristics in the choice between the private and 
nonprofit sectors in the provision of public goods. The quality of services provided by 
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day care centers, nursing homes and health care organizations can be difficult to monitor 
and evaluate. Partly, information asymmetries result from the imperfect link between 
those paying for the service (donors) and service recipients. Some recipients may be 
unable to express opinions or judge service quality as occurs in the case of children, 
mentally ill, or elderly persons. Contract failure theory has also been called trust theory 
because in nonprofit organizations information asymmetries between producers and 
service payers are minimized by removing the profit motive to signal trust (Hansmann, 
1987, 2003; Ortmann and Schlesinger, 2003; Anheier, 2005). 
Prior work addressing contract failure theory argues that information asymmetries 
can be overcome when the consumers are rich, because wealth allows customers to 
choose private for-profit organizations based on higher price/quality packages (Easley 
and O’Hara, 1983; Hansmann, 1987; Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1992). Empirical 
findings suggest that this hypothesis is most likely true for commercial nonprofits 
providing human and social services (Grønbjerg and Paarlberg, 2001). In contrast, the 
sociological literature argues that educational and cultural nonprofits are historically 
associated with wealthy sponsors that promote artistic and cultural endeavors to the 
enjoyment of the elites (DiMaggio, 1987).   
One criticism to contract failure theory states that information asymmetries may 
be insufficient to explain reliance in the nonprofit sector, particularly because the public 
sector can be as effective in overcoming those asymmetries. The underlying assumption 
here is that the public and the nonprofit sector are competitive alternatives to the private 
sector. However, in many instances, public and nonprofit organizations act as 
supplements or complements not adversaries in service delivery (Salamon, 1995; Young, 
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2006). In fact, recent work shows nonprofit firms frequently act as service allies, partners 
or contracted agents in delivering human and social services, particularly at the local 
level (Feiock and Andrew, 2006; Feiock and Jang, 2009). 
  
Entrepreneurship Theory 
In contrast with government failure and contract failure theories, entrepreneurship 
theory is a supply-side explanation for the size and growth of the nonprofit sector. 
Entrepreneurship theory is founded on the concept of entrepreneur, defined by 
Schumpeter as an individual willing and able to carry out new combinations of resources 
in the production process or a new organization of any industry (Schumpeter, 1934). His 
definition underlines the role of the entrepreneur in fostering innovation and stresses 
aspects such as creative energy, ingenuity, and leadership guidance in accomplishing 
progress. In this sense, nonprofit organizations can be described as innovative, both in 
terms of the services they supply (homes for battered women, counseling centers for 
sexually abused children, social work for refugees and immigrants) and the factors they 
employ (donatives, volunteer labor, and ‘atypical’ employment) (Badelt, 1997). 
The fiscal and financial pressures derived from the growth of the welfare state led 
to an expansion in the number and scope of nonprofit organizations capable of providing 
services under contract or in partnership with the local, state, and federal governments. 
This increase in demand was matched by supply-side factors that favored the formation 
of nonprofit organizations. Because nonprofit entrepreneurs are primarily motivated by 
nonmonetary goals, the creation and expansion of nonprofit organizations is mission-
driven and can be attributed to religious, ideological, or philanthropic values (Badelt, 
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1997; Auteri, 2003). As these factors vary between communities and countries, one can 
expect the supply of nonprofit organizations to vary between jurisdictions as well.  
Nevertheless, other factors operate against the growth of the nonprofit sector. The 
supply of capital is restricted for nonprofit organizations since they “cannot raise capital 
by issuing equity shares; they must then rely on debt, donations, and retained earnings for 
this purpose, sources that even in combination, offer a less responsive supply of capital 
than does the equity market.” (Auteri, 2003: 178). Furthermore, nonprofits are frequently 
limited by permanent endowments that add rigidity to the use of financial resources 
(Auteri, 2003).  
Empirical tests of the hypotheses suggested by entrepreneurship theory have been 
scarce. The limitations in the access to capital can explain, at least in part, the differences 
between for profit and nonprofit firms in response to increases in the demand for nursing 
care hospital care, and primary and secondary education (Hansmann, 1987a). Recent 
work by Eric Twombly (2003) indicates that mission is, in fact, an important determinant 
for the formation of nonprofit organizations in metropolitan areas. Urban areas with 
moralistic and traditionalistic cultures rely more heavily on charities to supply social 
services. This work also shows that the conditions of supply are extremely relevant to 
predict the formation of nonprofits, as metropolitan areas characterized by higher 
organizational density in the social service sector are less likely to witness the formation 
of nonprofit organizations to supply these services.  
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The Political Market for Nonprofit Organizations 
The nonprofit sector has assumed a major role in the implementation of social 
policy in close proximity with the end-users of services. The devolution of services to the 
local government level coupled with the growing fiscal stress experienced by 
municipalities in coping with increased pressures for performance has generated a 
significant reliance on nonprofit organizations to carry out the delivery of human and 
social services (Feiock and Andrew, 2006).  
Prior empirical analyses have failed to simultaneously address demand-side and 
supply-side factors explaining the size of the nonprofit sector. Our work begins to fill this 
important lacuna by proposing and testing an equilibrium model of supply and demand of 
nonprofit organizations (see Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins, 1998 for a political market 
model of regulatory instrument choice). This section presents the theory and summarizes 
the hypotheses, whereas the next describes the data and methods employed. 
Market equilibrium results from the aggregate decision of individual 
entrepreneurs to provide nonprofit services and the aggregate demand of community 
groups to consume those services. The supply of specific services by nonprofit firms 
reflects the decision to address demand heterogeneity among local groups.  Different 
groups and areas in a community have preferences regarding the level of social services 
that do not coincide with the median voter and in many situations these diverse 
preferences may have highly political and redistributive impacts. Preference diversity is 
likely to cause two effects. First, local officials committed to reelection will decline to 
support services that have redistributive consequences among citizens. Second, for 
services facing government failure there are two alternatives. For commercial services 
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such as day care centers or nursing homes, both for profit and nonprofit firms will 
compete for users. For noncommercial services involving donations, nonprofit firms are a 
viable alternative to attend preferences in service areas that do not receive enough 
coverage by the local government. This supplements government action to groups and 
activities that are not be attended through majoritarian decisions (Ferris, 1998). 
   
Supply-Side Hypotheses 
One of the major contributions of this work is to provide an empirical test of 
supply-side hypotheses, something the literature has failed to do in systematic fashion. 
Entrepreneurship theory argues that the supply of entrepreneurs is the decisive factor to 
explain the formation of nonprofit organizations because profit maximization is not part 
of the entrepreneurial set of goals (Young, 1987). In fact, the original work by 
Schumpeter emphasized the entrepreneur as an individual willing and able to carry out 
new combinations of resources in the production process or a new organization of any 
industry. This does not include profit making as a decisive feature of the entrepreneur.  
However, nonprofit entrepreneurs have been characterized by complex 
motivations that include “income, personal autonomy, satisfaction from the creative 
process, strong social beliefs, professional rewards, search for personal fulfillment, and 
personal recognition.” (Auteri, 2003: 181). In addition, these entrepreneurs are also 
subject to a set of intricate external constraints, namely complex funding, government 
regulation, donor preferences, and atypical staff (Auteri, 2003). This depiction of 
nonprofit entrepreneurs in the literature seems to suggest that this specific category of 
entrepreneurs is motivated by a different set of incentives that is fundamentally different 
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from for-profit entrepreneurs. If this is the case, the supply of both kinds of firms would 
be determined by the competition between both types of entrepreneurs, assuming that the 
number of entrepreneurs (of all types) in a community is limited. In face of contradictory 
arguments, we propose two competing hypothesis: 
 
H1 (The Schumpeterian hypothesis): The greater the supply of nonprofit entrepreneurs, 
the larger the local nonprofit sector 
H1a (The competition hypothesis): The greater the supply of for-profit entrepreneurs, the 
smaller the local nonprofit sector   
 
The ‘geography of generosity’ has been under discussion since the 1980s, not 
only as a result of the efforts of geographers (Wolpert and Reiner, 1985; Wolpert, 1988; 
Wilson, 1989), but also public policy scholars (Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Wolch, 
2001). This literature argues that the aggregate supply of generosity varies among 
jurisdictions, partly due to differences in personal and corporate income, partly due to 
social cohesion and cultural and religious values. The welfare services provided by 
nonprofit organizations depend, at least in part, upon donatives. Donors rely on nonprofit 
firms to deliver services to beneficiaries and usually do not have any contact with the 
intended recipients (Hansmann, 1987). In the case of noncommercial services such as 
homeless care, donations are decisive to achieve better coverage of target populations. 
Hence, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: More generous communities are more likely to have large local nonprofit sectors 
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In most industrial societies, organized religion is associated with service provision 
in the education, health care, and welfare sectors. Several scholars have suggested that 
the growth of religious nonprofit activity is directly associated with the level of religious 
competition in an effort to attract adherents (James, 1987; Salamon and Anheier 1998). 
This theoretical argument is certainly valid for religiously diverse societies such as the 
United States, but it is far less defensible in more homogenous societies. In countries 
where citizens are overwhelmingly Catholic, such as Italy or Portugal for example, it may 
be more informative to talk about degrees of religiousness. This is particularly true in the 
case of Portugal, where the misericórdias, in existence since the XV century, were 
initially created and supported by the Catholic Church to provide health assistance and 
support for children, elderly and disabled persons (Perista, 2001). Therefore, we argue 
that:  
 
H3: The greater the proportion of Catholics, the larger the local nonprofit sector 
 
An extension of government failure theory suggests that nonprofits are present in 
jurisdictions where government is unable to satisfy the demand for specific types of 
services. This idea is frequently presented as a demand-side argument, but it can be recast 
as a supply-side hypothesis. The size of the nonprofit sector increases when the fiscal 
capacity of local governments is diminished, because this prevents local officials from 
attending increasing demands for public goods. Here, the nonprofit sector fulfills 
demands left unattended by the local government. 
 16 
However, it is also argued in the literature that local government frequently 
subsidizes service provision through direct grants, subsidies and tax exemptions to the 
nonprofit sector. In this case, the nonprofit sector is a partner rather than a competitor of 
the public sector, and fiscal health can actually contribute to a large local nonprofit 
sector. Hence, we present two competing hypotheses: 
       
H4 (The partnership hypothesis): Communities experiencing better fiscal health are more 
likely to have larger nonprofit sectors  
H4a (The competition hypothesis): Communities experiencing better fiscal health are less 
likely to have larger nonprofit sectors. 
 
Even though entrepreneurship theory suggests that the formation and expansion of 
the nonprofit sector is largely the product of individual entrepreneurs, our explanation 
also accommodates the idea that religious and ideological organizations (James, 1990), as 
well as government (in)capacity to deliver services demanded by citizens also contribute 
to the growth of the third sector. 
 
Demand-Side Hypotheses 
According to government failure theory, nonprofit firms provide services to fulfill 
the demand of citizens with preferences for public goods greater than the median voter 
(Weisbrod, 1975). These firms are financed by donors that prefer to sponsor specific 
services provided to particular groups rather than general financial aid for the poor (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996). 
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Unlike local government officials, nonprofit entrepreneurs are not subject to the 
constraints imposed by median voter preferences, so they are able to supply services to 
citizens not covered by the public sector. In turn, non-median voters search for nonprofit 
firms that can satisfy their unmet demands (Matsunaga and Yamauchi, 2004). A few 
examples should help to illustrate this point, particularly because most populations served 
by nonprofits providing welfare services are either not voters at all or represent a very 
small segment of the voting population.  
Communities where children are a large proportion of the general population are 
expected to have more nonprofit day care centers to address this specific demand. Hence, 
birth rates should be positively associated with this type of service. In contrast, all else 
being equal, communities that have a large proportion of elderly population are likely to 
have more nonprofit nursing homes and nonprofit home care organizations. The 
proportion of school aged population in a community should also be positively associated 
with the number of nonprofit leisure centers.  
An even more extreme example is homelessness. Homeless persons live on the 
margins of society. They are unemployed, rely on charity for survival, and do not have a 
stable home address; they fit perfectly the description of non-median voters, essentially 
because they do not vote at all. Homeless care organizations are supported by donors that 
expect nonprofits to deliver adequate services to these transient populations. Jurisdictions 
with high unemployment rates and a large proportion of welfare recipients are likely to 
have a larger share of homeless care nonprofit organizations. 
Population size can also be employed as a proxy for preference heterogeneity 
(Rodrigues, Tavares and Araújo, 2011). Larger cities have more socially and culturally 
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diverse populations and nonprofit organizations cater to these preferences. A similar 
argument can be developed regarding the proportion of foreign residents in a community. 
In fact, recent work by Cordero-Guzmán and colleagues find empirical support for the 
connection between immigrant populations and nonprofit activity in the cities of New 
York and Chicago (Cordero-Guzmán et al., 2008).    
 
H5: Communities experiencing demand heterogeneity are more likely to have larger 
nonprofit sectors 
H5.1. The type of demand affects the number and size of nonprofit firms by service 
activity area 
H5.2. The size of the local nonprofit sector varies positively with population size 
H5.3. The size of the local nonprofit sector varies positively with the proportion of 
foreign residents 
 
Contract failure theory argues that information asymmetries between producers 
and consumers can be minimized when consumers are able to choose between for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations providing excludable public goods (Ben-Ner and Gui, 2003). 
Nonprofit organizations are preferred by consumers unable to monitor and judge the 
quality of performance at low cost because the non-distribution constraint minimizes 
information asymmetries (Matsunaga and Yamauchi, 2004). On the aggregate, wealthier 
communities are likely to attract private firms providing top quality services in the fields 
of health and education, leaving less market share for the action of nonprofit 
organizations (Bielefeld and Murdoch, 2004).  
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In the case of nonprofits providing welfare services, the information asymmetry 
problem is compounded by the fact that donors are not the direct consumers of services 
and may be unable to evaluate the quantity and quality of services rendered to end-users. 
Again, in communities experiencing economic decline, nonprofit firms are likely to be 
preferred over their for-profit counterparts because they are deemed more trustworthy 
and less likely to take advantage of information asymmetries. As a result, we expect that:   
 
H6: The lower the level of per capita personal income, the larger the local nonprofit 
sector 
 
This section extended prior work to propose an equilibrium approach to explain 
the size of the nonprofit sector. The hypotheses suggested here are very general and 
require the appropriate indicators to allow a test of our theoretical arguments. Now we 
turn to the data and methods employed in the analysis.   
 
Data and Methods 
When presenting our hypotheses, we discussed several determinants of the uneven 
distribution of nonprofit organizations across jurisdictions. The variables included in the 
analysis reflect both demand-side and supply-side arguments included in a political 
market framework for nonprofit organizations. Variable choice is based upon three 
criteria: 1) the nature of the services provided by nonprofit firms (our dependent 
variables); 2) the context of our study (Portugal); and 3) limitations on data availability. 
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The study analyzes nonprofit sector size across the 278 municipalities in 
Continental Portugal. The size of the nonprofit sector in each locality is measured in two 
ways. First, we use the number of nonprofit firms in each jurisdiction registered in 2010 
with the Social Security Financial Management Office of the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security. Data validity is assured, since this registration is mandatory for the 
formation of each new nonprofit organization. Most empirical work has employed the 
number of nonprofit firms in each jurisdiction as a proxy for the size of the local 
nonprofit sector (Marcuello, 1998; Corbin, 1999; Grønbjerg and Paarlberg, 2001). 
However, more recent work criticizes the reliance on this measure, arguing that it treats 
firms with very dissimilar budgets as analogous organizations (Matsunaga andYamauchi, 
2004). In order to overcome this criticism, we also employ the number of service users to 
gauge nonprofit sector size and capacity to tackle local demands for public goods. In both 
cases, the dependent variables are divided into five categories covering different human 
and social services provided by the nonprofit sector: day care facilities, nursing homes, 
homecare organizations, leisure facilities, and homeless care organizations. 
The model specifications include four supply-side variables. The supply of 
entrepreneurs is measured by the establishment of new for-profit firms in each 
jurisdiction in the year 2009 as gathered by the National Bureau of Statistics (INE, 2009). 
The most appropriate measure for nonprofit entrepreneurship is the number of nonprofits 
created in a given year in each jurisdiction, but since this information is unavailable, we 
use the number of new for-profit firms as a proxy for the supply of entrepreneurs in a 
given jurisdiction to test the first hypothesis.  
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The level of community generosity is gauged by citizen donations recorded in the 
2009 income tax returns. This information is provided by the Portuguese Internal 
Revenue Service (Direcção Geral de Impostos) of the Ministry of Finance.  
Portugal is characterized by significant differences in religious practices across 
the territory. The north is far more involved in religious activities than the south. 
Indicators such as church attendance, Sunday school attendance or the number of 
baptisms confirm these geographic differences. Unfortunately, these indicators are only 
available for religious jurisdictions, which do not coincide with local government 
jurisdictions. The only indicator available by municipality from the National Bureau of 
Statistics is the proportion of Catholic weddings, which we employ as a measure of 
religious practice. 
The indicator to gauge the financial status of the municipality is extracted from 
the Financial Yearbook of Portuguese Local Governments edited by Carvalho, 
Fernandes, Jorge, and Camões (2006) and published by the Center for Research in Public 
Policy and Administration. Fiscal health is a budget measure of local government 
capacity to either produce public services directly or subsidize production through the 
delegation of these tasks to nonprofit organizations.  
Local demand for human and social services is assessed by a set of demand-side 
variables that are included in our models according to the type of service provided by 
nonprofit firms. Birth rate by jurisdiction is measured as the number of births per 100 
individuals and included in the day care center models. The elderly dependency rate is 
obtained by dividing the population over 65 years by the active population (aged 14-65 
years-old) and multiplying by 100. The schooling rate is the population enrolled in high 
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school education divided by resident population with ages between 15 and 17 years-old. 
The unemployment rate is the proportion of individuals registered at employment centers 
on the total of the active population. The number of welfare recipients is simply the 
number of individuals that benefit from the national program of minimum income 
subsidy (Rendimento Social de Inserção). All these variables are collected from the 
National Bureau of Statistics (INE, 2009). All models include the log of foreign 
population living in the jurisdiction as a general measure of demand heterogeneity. 
Foreign population was retrieved from the National Bureau of Immigration Services 
(Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras). All demand-side measures should be positively 
associated with the number of nonprofit firms and nonprofit sector size.  
Information asymmetries between for-profit producers and consumers can be 
minimized at a cost. Per capita personal income by jurisdiction should be negatively 
associated with the nonprofit sector size. We also included the size of the jurisdiction 
measured by population, the number of parishes1 and a dummy variable for district 
capitals as additional demand-side variables. Income and population data were collected 
from the National Bureau of Statistics (INE, 2009). All variables and indicators are 
summarized in table 1 with their descriptive statistics. 
[Table 1 here] 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to estimate the models using 
the number of users as the dependent variable. Results of OLS regressions are presented 
                                                            
1 Portuguese local governments are divided in parishes (freguesias), the smallest unit of self-government, 
with a low number of competences and heavily financially dependent on the municipal government. The 
boundaries of parishes are contained inside each municipality and one parish cannot belong to more than 
one municipality. The number of parishes in each municipality can vary significantly, from one, when the 
boundary of the parish coincides with the boundary of the municipality, up to 89, where each parish is 
equivalent to a neighbourhood (Silva, 2004). 
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on table 2. The number of nonprofit organizations in each jurisdiction is a count variable, 
which requires the use of negative binomial regression. This is the appropriate estimation 
technique to treat event counts, when the assumption that the conditional mean of the 
distribution equals the conditional variance (equidispersion) does not hold. We tested our 
models for overdispersion and the goodness-of-fit χ2 test allows us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the data are Poisson distributed, so negative binomial regression models 
are used in the estimation. The negative binomial regression results are presented in 
Table 3. Coefficients are reported as incidence-rate ratios that represent an advantage in 
interpretation over standard negative binomial coefficients, since they do not depend on 
the level of the variable of interest or all other variables included in the model. A unit 
change in a given independent variable Xk changes the output count by a factor of exp(βk) 
(Long, 1997: 225). 
[Table 2 here] 
Empirical Findings 
 
The overall results confirm the existence of both demand-side and supply-side 
effects to explain the uneven distribution of nonprofit organizations across local 
jurisdictions in Portugal. Supply-side explanations regarding citizen donations and 
entrepreneurship receive strong support, but the degree of religiousness and local 
government fiscal health miss statistical significance and do not contribute as 
explanations to our supply-side arguments.  
The first set of models, using the number of service users as the dependent 
variable, confirms the arguments concerning the geography of generosity. Jurisdictions 
where citizen donations are higher also display a larger number of all types of service 
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users. This effect is particularly strong for day care centers: on average, a 1,000 dollar 
increase in citizen donations increases the number of service users by 8. Citizen 
donations have a weaker impact upon leisure center service users, perhaps because 
donations are less relevant for the provision of this kind of service. In the case of 
nonprofit establishments, the results regarding citizen donations are consistent, albeit 
missing statistical significance in three services. In the aggregate, our results confirm the 
hypothesis that the level of altruism is a strong predictor of reliance in nonprofit sector 
organizations for delivering human and social services. 
The entrepreneurship variable is negatively associated with nonprofit sector size. 
This indicates strong support for the competition hypothesis in detriment of the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis. In general, an increase in the number of newly created private 
companies is associated with smaller numbers of nonprofit firms and service users. If 
entrepreneurs are primarily interested in forming for-profit companies, less 
entrepreneurship is available for the nonprofit sector. The only exception to this finding is 
the positive relationship between new private companies and the number of users of day 
care facilities. In the case of day care centers, it is possible that the choice for using these 
services also depends on the level of income. In other words, the effect of the number of 
births on nonprofit day care users may be mediated by different levels of income, which 
will require testing of an interaction hypothesis. 
Demand side hypotheses receive a strong level of support. Jurisdictions where 
particular groups are prevalent display a larger degree of reliance in nonprofit sector 
organizations to supplement government action (Weisbrod, 1977). The evidence also 
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indicates that the nonprofit market is responsive to citizen preferences for all kinds of 
human and social services.  
[Table 3 here] 
The findings concerning demand heterogeneity are consistent with the general 
predictions of government failure theory. Low levels of income and higher levels of 
population (national and foreign) generate complex situations with a great diversity of 
needs that local officials are unable or unwilling to satisfy. This unattended demand 
compels the creation and expansion of nonprofit organizations. 
Looking at the specific results for each nonprofit category, evidence confirms the 
majority of our demand-side hypotheses. Elderly dependency rate is an important 
demand-side factor of the creation and size of nonprofit nursing homes and home care 
organizations. Similarly, the schooling rate variable is an important predictor of both 
nonprofit organizations and service users on the leisure sector. We also find that the 
unemployment rate is positively associated with the number of users of homeless care 
organizations. 
The coefficient for population size is always positively associated with the 
number of nonprofits and service users. This concurs with prior findings concerning the 
connection between population size and nonprofit contracting by local governments for 
elder service production (Feiock and Jang, 2006). Population size is usually a good proxy 
for preference diversity, as more populated and urban areas tend to display a larger 
demand for services provided by local governments.  District capitals are a strong 
predictor of nonprofit localization for similar reasons. Historically, district capitals have 
been more populated, socially dynamic, and true engines of regional economic 
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development. Currently, this is still the case in the overwhelming majority of the 18 
districts. The results also confirm the number of parishes as an important demand-side 
predictor as parishes are associated with preference diversity regarding service provision, 
raising the level of internal competition for resources and services within the 
municipality. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Research on the uneven distribution of nonprofits has been primarily focused on 
testing demand-side hypotheses. Government failure theory and contract failure theory 
are the main accounts for the variation of nonprofit firm activity across local 
jurisdictions. Authors focusing on the demand-side of the market argue that local 
government officials tend to promote policies targeted to the median voter, ignoring 
citizens with above average preferences for human and social services. As a result, 
specific groups in the local population seek nonprofit organizations to fulfill their 
unattended demands. However, demand-side explanations have ignored the ‘geography 
of generosity’ as a supply-side justification for different degrees of nonprofit 
concentration and service across jurisdictions.  
The main argument developed in this manuscript is that both sides of the political 
market are equally important in explaining the formation, development, and size of the 
local nonprofit market. The demand-side variables behave according to predictions, as 
demands from specific groups are satisfied through the nonprofit market. More diverse 
communities with less affluent populations are also more likely to rely on nonprofit 
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organizations to act as substitutes for government services in the human and social 
sectors.  
However, the geographic dispersion of nonprofits cannot be explained in full just 
by looking at demand. In fact, our findings also confirm that community capacity to 
respond based on philanthropic values and generosity is the most decisive factor on the 
supply-side of the market. Citizen donations determine the size of the local nonprofit 
sector, therefore contributing for a better response to citizen preferences. This finding 
constitutes the major contribution of our analysis and underscores the role of supply 
mechanisms in attending specific social policy demands.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Establishment         
Daycare 29.92086  50,15083 0 431 
Nursing 6,77381 7,708761 0 77 
Home Care 11,11151 10,81541 0 77 
Leisure  1,165468 2,571988 0 26 
Homelesse care 19,30576 27,03648 0 224 
Users         
Daycare 875,5 1856,988 0 22780 
Nursing 188,7734 200,4326 0 2076 
Home care 231,3525 265,025 0 2656 
Leisure  19,10432 4206776 0 313 
Homelesse care 495,2554 843,0288 0 7586 
Independent     
Income (log) 2.78772  .4206531           0    3.182714 
Population (log) 4.168588       .7765429           0 5.707358 
Parishes 14.52158  12.77172           1 89 
Foreign population (log) 2.466842 .750607      .60206    4.638759 
Catholic weddings (percent) 46.30827  16.30886 0 84 
Citizen donations 57647.75  191000.2 391.74     2620564 
New private firms 13.8373  1.62165 9.04       18.11 
Fiscal health 1.70e+07  4.89e+07    -1.69e+07    7.35e+08 
Birth rate 8.142446  2.356249 2 15.2 
Elderly dependency rate 34.6826  11.83087 14.5816    82.02159 
Schooling rate 86.68175  45.56703 0   267.9172 
Unemployment rate .0350635 .0127075 .0105949 .0845307 
Welfare recipientes (log) 2.831015 .5335509 1.643453 5.026051 
District capital .0647482  .2465248 0 1 
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Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression (dependent variable: number of service users) 
 
 Daycare Nursing Homes Home Care Leisure Homeless Care 
Independent variables Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Income (log) -150.0361 
(242.2109) 
-139.7522** 
(70.39645) 
-255.7585*** 
(60.61882) 
-.804895 
(.6292951) 
-14.97006** 
(7.430575) 
Population (log) 27.02223 
(156.4351) 
56.05996 
(43.08593) 
159.7674*** 
(35.66653) 
.1467528 
(.3757485) 
7.521712* 
(4.536142) 
Parishes 17.48701*** 
(6.572763) 
2.96942*** 
(1.107894) 
2.706278***     
(.82264) 
.0055363 
(.011835) 
.3872034 ** 
(.1513817) 
Foreign population 
(log) 
271.3017*** 
(98.23705) 
31.80341 
(31.20954) 
33.86685**   
(17.56528) 
.2305063 
(.2892131) 
5.092536 ** 
(2.406442) 
Catholic weddings 2.88414 
(1.948003) 
-.2528345 
(.4598188) 
.3377573    
(.4816912) 
-.0026612 
(.0044044) 
.0565659 
(.0486331) 
Citizens donations .0079799*** 
(.0010069) 
.0006081*** 
(.0001303) 
.0009531***    
(.0001965) 
8.87e-06 ** 
(4.77e-06) 
.0001038 *** 
(.0000341) 
New private 
companies  
41.39387** 
(20.14408) 
-8.16616* 
(4.965853) 
-13.06324** 
(6.305941) 
.0099731 
(.0823536) 
-1.80041 *** 
(.6655843) 
Fiscal health -1.30e-06 
(3.54e-06) 
-1.87e-07 
(4.69e-07) 
-7.34e-07 
(6.90e-07) 
-1.07e-08  
(1.47e-08) 
-1.32e-07  
(1.12e-07) 
Birth rate 15.27661 
(18.61332) 
    
Elderly dependency 
rate 
 1.848826 ** 
(.7383398) 
3.924655***   
(.6500603) 
  
Schooling rate    .007216 *** 
(.0027704) 
 
Unemployment rate     54.46875 
(7.06324) 
Welfare recipients 
(log) 
    - 3.092773 
(3.272318) 
District capital 716.6101*** 
(256.1143) 
160.3823*** 
(45.70134) 
228.5462***    
(47.97752) 
3.31377 *** 
(.9159917) 
15.06071** 
(6.842932) 
Constant -1057.165** 
(530.7047) 
241.4218** 
(123.9493) 
127.2018    
(120.7975) 
.9159917 
(1.657996 
18.41144 
(14.72483) 
Observations 
F (10,267) 
Prob>F 
R2 
278 
273.82 
.000 
.8992 
278 
44.05 
.0000 
.6777 
278 
191.52 
.0000 
.7816 
278 
14.59 
.0000 
. 6287 
278 
20.14 
.000 
.7214 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors. 
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Table 3. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis (dependent variable: number of establishments) 
 
 Daycare Nursing Homes Home Care Leisure Homeless Care 
Independent 
variables 
RRR 
(RSE) 
RRR 
(RSE) 
RRR 
(RSE) 
RRR 
(RSE) 
RRR 
(RSE) 
Income (log) .0525693 *** 
(.0215047) 
.1282508 *** 
(.0623027) 
.0929473*** 
(.0338255) 
.1426949*** 
(.0822192) 
.1356594 *** 
(.0637483) 
Population (log) 5.452699 *** 
(1.307691) 
3.193321 *** 
(.8996724) 
4.224673*** 
(.87496) 
2.773591*** 
(.9755661) 
3.19463 *** 
(.8468911) 
Number parishes 1.000438 
(.0043481) 
1.008702 
(.0043101) 
1.013794 *** 
(.0041253) 
1.008405 
(.0057845) 
1.00784 * 
(.0040929) 
Foreign population 
(log) 
1.385425 *** 
(.1632918) 
.9331672 
(.1990786) 
1.047534 
(.1060821) 
1.947446*** 
(.4212644) 
1.306516 *** 
(.1702347) 
Catholic weddings .9996363 
(.0037211) 
.9981083 
(.0034063) 
1.003779 
(.0026534) 
.9963531 
(.0072521) 
1.003408 
(.0031494) 
Citizens donations 1.000001 
(4.07e-07) 
1.000001** 
(3.66e-07) 
1 
(3.98e-07) 
.9999997 
(6.53e-07) 
1.000001 ** 
(4.18e-07) 
New private 
companies 
.991498 
(.0417422) 
.9393749* 
(.0346527) 
.930396 ** 
(.0277694) 
.9440358 
(.0921897) 
.9019271 *** 
(.0354166) 
Fiscal health 1 
(1.60e-09) 
1 
(1.31e-09) 
1 
(1.55e-09) 
1 
(2.32e-09) 
1 
(1.96e-09) 
Birth rate 1.007735 
(.0311564) 
    
Elderly dependency 
rate 
 1.011932 * 
(.0051058) 
1.028484 *** 
(.0039135) 
  
Schooling rate    1.007137 *** 
(.0020875) 
 
Unemployment rate     .000283** 
(.0012159) 
Welfare recipients 
(log) 
    1.1637 
(.2262121) 
District capital 1.850783*** 
(.2482589) 
1.762917 *** 
(.2257852) 
1.423291*** 
(.1741875) 
2.036994 *** 
(.4639586) 
1.334483 ** 
(.1926306) 
Observations 
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
278 
751.33 
.0000 
278 
606.96 
.0000 
278 
538.30 
.0000 
278 
285.81 
.0000 
278 
591.49 
.0000 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
